tution, clearly setting the pattem for later Conventions. Moreover, these States were distinctive also in submitting the constitution framed by the Convention to the elec tors for approval, with Massachusetts widening its franchise on that occasion to in clude all adult males (Hoar, 1917:4-7; Warren, 1937:347; Beer, 1993:309-10) .
Undoubtedly the most important Constitutional Convention was the federal Convention, which met from May to September 1787 in Philadelphia, supposedly to revise the Articles of Confederation, but which ended up drafting a completely new constitution. The 55 delegates from twelve States (Rhode Island was not repre sented) were selected by their State legislatures, and their handiwork, the United States Constitution, was submitted for approval not to the electors themselves but to popularly elected State Conventions, a procedure which 'sought to reconcile wide popular approval with rational deliberation' (Beer, 1993:312) .
The methods of amendment specified by the United States Constitution com prise a complex series of alternative procedures reflecting in various degrees the foundational principles of federalism, representative government and popular sov ereignty, although direct popular approval is not included. Amendments must be proposed either by a two-thirds majority of both Houses of Congress or by a Con vention called by Congress at the instance of two-thirds of the State legislatures. The former has been the sole method employed; although frequently advocated, no federal Convention has been held since 1787 (see W eber & Perry, 1989 . Pro posed amendments must be ratified by either the legislature or Conventions in three-quarters of the States, the appropriate mode being stipulated by Congress (US Constitution art V). To date, only one amendment has been ratified by State Con ventions: die 21st (1933) , which repealed die 18di.
One advantage of a national Consdtudonal Convendon is diat it would enable amendment proposals to be sent to die States for radficadon widiout passing through die sieve of Congress. President Idncoln, for example, advocated diis route in his first inaugural address (1861) because it allows amendments to originate widi die people dicmselves, instead of only permitdng diem to take, or reject, proposidons, originated by odiers, not especially chosen for die purpose, and which might not be precisely such, as they would wish to either accept or refuse.
However, diese pleas have so far fallen on deaf ears. But while die Consdtudonal Convendon has been litde employed at die federal level, die opposite is true of die American States where, as the Australian consdtudonal framers well knew, consdtudon-revision Convendons have been a frequent phenomenon since 1776 (see for example Deakin, in Australasian Federadon Conference, 1890:248) .
The first Australian federal 'Convendon' was a meedng of representadves of the seven Australasian colonies and Fiji held in Sydney in November-December 1883. It led to die establishment of die Federal Council of Australasia, which New South Wales and New Zealand never joined. At die instance of Victorian Premier James Service, die gathering 'grandiloquendy called itself a convendon' (Garran, 1958:44) , instead of a 'conference', the description favoured by New South Wales and Queensland and pressed unsuccessfully by New South Wales Attorney-General W. B. Dailey (Hirst, 1997:25) .
No one has disputed die denomination of die next Convention, die Nadonal Australasian Convention held in Sydney from 2 March to 9 April 1891. It was at tended by seven representadves from each Australian colony and diree from New Zealand, all elected by dieir respecdve parliaments. American precedents -bodi federal and State -had been cited by Alfred Dcakin in successfully moving for such a Convention a year earlier at die Australasian Federadon Conference in Mel bourne (Australasian Federadon Conference, 1890:246-8) . The Convendon pro duced a draft nadonal Consdtudon which is a close ancestor of die present Austra lian Consdtudon. But John I,a Nauze (1972:78) employed dramadc overstatement in asserdng diat '[tjhe draft of 1891 is die Consdtudon of 1900, not its father or grandfadier'.
W hen the States, especially New Soudi Wales, failed to advance consideradon of the 1891 draft Consdtudon, die federal movement hit die 'doldrums' (Garran, 1958:99) from which it was rescued by die Premiers' decision to convene a second, popularly elected, Convendon and submit its handiwork to the electors for approval before transmission to Westminster for enactment. In Stuart Macintyre's (1993) apt condnuadon of die aeolian metaphor, widi die decision to convene a popularly elected assembly 'die wind of public pardcipadon began to fill |die federal] sails'. As John Hirst (1996:42) has noted, die Corowa (1893) formula, which was en dorsed at die January 1895 Premiers' Conference in Hobart -a popularly elected Convendon to frame a Consdtudon to be approved by die electors before enact ment at Westminster -was 'an amazing process ... Quite un-Bridsh'. But to what extent die post-Corowa federadon movement can be considered 'popular', and whedier federadon was 'brought to life by die people', as Sir Robert Garran (1958:101) claimed, maybe debated (de Garis, 1993; Macintyre, 1994; Macintyre, 1997:25-7) .
Another Popular Convention?
The 1897-98 Australasian Federal Convendon, which essendally produced die pre sent Commonwealdi Consdtudon, was die only Australian Convendon to be popu larly elected and die only one whose efforts were crowned widi success in the sense of seeing its proposals implemented. The two 20di-ccntury Convendons, those of 1942 and 1973-85, comprised polidcians: Commonwealdi and State representadves in the former, and Commonwealdi, State, Territory and local government represen tadves in die latter. But none of die former's proposals, and few of the latter's, have been adopted at referendum. Indeed, as is well known, only eight of die 42 pro posals put to referendum have been carried. This rather dismal record has led to suggestions for reform both in the re quirements for adopting a constitutional amendment and in the process whereby proposed amendments are formulated. The former include proposals to allow the States (and possibly also citizens), as well as die Commonwealth parliament, to initi ate proposed amendments, and to liberalise the requirements for passage by requir ing approval by a majority of electors in three, rather than four, States in addition to approval by a national majority of electors (see House of Representatives Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, 1997:57) . However, since none of these proposals (which raise broad and important issues) has been implemented, they need not be considered further here.
O f greater interest here are proposals to alter the process whereby constitu tional reform is considered. Apart from the two non-popularly elected Conventions (1942, , extensive constitutional review has been undertaken by a Royal Commission (1927 -29), a Joint Commonwealth Parliamentary Committee (1956 ) and a Commission assisted by live committees ). Yet, despite the high quality of the resulting reports, they have virtually nothing to show in the way of ac tual constitutional amendment. Hence it is understandable that some have won dered whether the successful formula of 1897-98 might not be revived, although a major difference, of course, is that proposed amendments must be approved not only by die electors, but must first secure die support of die Commonwealth par liament, or at least die House of Representadves and, dierefore, die government. Moreover, it is difficult to assess how important popular election was to die success of die 1897-98 Convention, for its membership of leading colonial polidcians was not significandy different from diat of die 1891 Convendon whose delegates were elected by die colonial parliaments. Nevertheless, a popularly elected Convendon has been advocated by highly informed commentators such as Sir Robert Garran, Sir Robert Menzies and, more recendy, R. D. Lumb (Garran, 1958:209-11; McMillan et al., 1983:357; Lumb, 1992 Lumb, , 1993 . The concept was supported in earlier years by W. M. Hughes and Earle Page; die Hughes Government intro duced a Bill for a partly elected Consdtudonal Convendon in December 1921, but it was not proceeded widi (Lumb, 1992:59-60) .
Arguments in favour of a popular Convendon include, first, diat die elecdon focuses public attendon on die relevant issues and die proceedings of die Conven don. In odier words, it is a significant educative process. As an editorial in the Age noted on Australia Day 1993, a popularly elected Convendon 'would engage public imaginadon, broaden public involvement and raise public consciousness. It would enjoy the sort of legitimacy that is lacking in government-appointed or selfappointed bodies examining constitutional change'. Even the non-compulsory postal ballot to elect half the delegates to the February 1998 Convention has raised public awareness of the republican debate, although it is too early to assess the edu cative value of that experience.
Second, the general public probably lacks confidence in its understanding of the issues, but is concerned to see them receive proper consideration, which the deliberations of a Convention especially elected for the purpose may satisfy. The ten days set aside for the 1998 Convention to debate die republic should alleviate public anxiety in this respect.
Third, a popularly elected Convention should reflect die diverse views of die electorate and their reladve preponderance.
Since proposed consdtudonal amendments must be approved at referendum, diere is obvious value in exposing diem to consideradon by such a represcntadve body. For similar reasons, it has occasionally been suggested that die members of a Consdtudonal Convendon be chosen by random selecdon, like a jury (Mueller, 1996:315-16) . Such an assembly might be 'die most likely to take into account die long-term interests of all future cidzens and agree to a compromise' (Mueller, 1996:316) . But, unlike die far larger samples selected for reliable public opinion polling, die membership of a Conven don would seem to be too small for accurate rcflecdon of die various shades of public opinion. The 1998 Convendon will derive litde benefit from this representadve aspect of a popularly elected Convendon because only half its membership will be elected and even diose members were not elected by die compulsory vodng which will presumably apply to die uldmate section 128 referendum.
Moreover, diere are negadve aspects to a popularly elected Convendon, apart from die cost of die elecdon (around $50m). First is a concern diat, as an Ameri can commentator noted, 'particularly in diis age of television and mass-media dominance' die Convendon will be 'filled widi pop singers and adiletes who, among odicr deficiencies, lack expertise on consdtudonal matters' (Mueller, 1996:315) . Such concern has been voiced regarding die candidates for elecdon to die 1998 Convention, with Greg Craven reported as complaining dial dieir quality was 'a mat ter of deep nadonal embarrassment', especially when compared widi die Convendons of die 1890s:
Where is Barton, where is Deakin, where is GrifTidi, where is Playford, where is Andrew Inglis Clark, where is George Reid, where is Henry Parkes, where is Henry Higgins, where is Isaac Isaacs and where is Josiah Symon, where is Sir John Forrest? It goes on and on and on and on. (Rintoul et al., 1997) However, diis anxiety appears unwarranted. While die consdtudonal expertise of leading candidates for die Convendon may well be inferior to diat of 1897-98 delegates such as Barton, Deakin, Isaacs and Higgins (Griffidi and Inglis Clark did not attend diat Convendon), no one would propose popular elecdon to assemble a body of experts in constitutional law, or any other subject for that matter. But the overall quality of leading candidates is no cause for disquiet. Constitutional exper tise can be provided by the Commonwealdi government, and indeed there is con siderable political, legal and historical expertise among the appointed delegates and parliamentary representatives at the 1998 Convention.
A more significant concern is that the division of opinion in the community will be reflected among the Convention delegates, leading to deadlock in its proceed ings. The 'boycott' of die American federal Convention of 1787 by leading 'anti federalists' such as Patrick Henry undoubtedly facilitated consensus at that (nonpopularly elected) Convention (Mueller, 1996:323) . Thus, a distinguished Cana dian constitutional scholar, Edward McWhinney (1981:33) , has remarked:
For its most effective operation, a constituent assembly would seem to re quire to be elected against a background of an already existing, and continu ing, societal consensus as to die nature and desired direction of fundamen tal political, social and economic -and hence consdtudonal -change.
For this reason, a Consdtudonal Convention on die republic would have had a greater prospect of achieving consensus if it had been preceded by an indicative (not legally binding) plebiscite on die question whedier Australia should sever its consti tutional links widi die Crown, and perhaps also on die appropriate method of se lecting a republican head of state. Assuming a pro-republic vote in the plebiscite, the Convention would then have confined its attention to die details of republican government widiin the constraints imposed by the results of die plebiscite, and there would have been litde point in monarchist candidates standing for election. Such a course of action was widely advocated. The Australian Labor Party (ALP) and die Sydney Morning H endd urged an indicative plebiscite followed by the framing of a proposed constitutional amendment by a Commonwealth parliamentary commit tee; indeed die ALP and die Australian Democrats introduced a Bill for a plebiscite in die Senate, die Plebiscite for an Australian Republic Bill 1997. New Zealand provides a model in this respect, MMP having been adopted following an indicative plebiscite (called an 'indicative referendum') among several electoral systems which led to die enactment of legislation which came into effect upon approval by the elec tors at a referendum. However, the contrary view -that the public education provided by a Con vention is a necessary prelude to any plebiscite -also carries considerable weight, and was probably best argued by Bob Ellicott (1996) : Doubt, suspicion, an absence of die important detail, in die hands of skilful campaigners, could easily lead people to vote no in an early plebiscite when their ultimate informed view might well be quite different... The holding of some form of convention is probably die best way of informing people of die issues involved and die merits of the solutions available.
In any event, die Howard Government ignored calls for an indicative plebiscite from die ALP, the Australian Democrats, die Australian Republican Movement and odiers, and instead honoured its 1996 election promise by establishing a Con vention, half popularly elected, to consider not only the form and timing of an Aus tralian republic, but also die preliminary question of whether links with die Crown should be severed.
The 1998 Convention
The 1998 Convention will comprise 152 delegates of whom half were popularly elected in a noil-compulsory national postal ballot held from early November to 9 December 1997. About 47 per cent of eligible voters participated. The ballot was conducted on State/Territory-wide electorates with State representation roughly proportional to population. The election was heavily contested, notwithstanding a $500 non-refundable fee payable by each candidate. In New Soudi Wales 174 candidates contested 20 seats; Victoria 158 for 16 seats; Queensland 129 for 13 seats; Western Australia 59 for nine seats; Soudi Australia 38 for eight scats; Tas mania 23 for six seats; Australian Capital Territory 16 for two seats; and Northern Territory 12 for two seats {Sydney Morning Herald, 10 October 1997). Many can didates stood as part of a monarchist or republican 'ticket', but many others stood as independents. The ballot paper allowed voters to choose eidier a group or a number of candidates equal to diat State or Territory's representation at the Con vention. Members of die Commonwealdi, State and Territory parliaments and ap pointed delegates were ineligible for nomination as elected delegates and conse- The Convendon's composidon -essendally half popularly elected, onequarter parliamentary and one-quarter reasonably broadly based appointed dele gates -would seem to auger quite well, for several reasons. First, it has long been considered appropriate diat die forum for debadng consdtudonal reform should reflect the consdtuencies which must uldmately be persuaded to approve proposed amendments : the Commonwealdi parliament and die electors, bodi nationally and in four States. This suggests diat a Consdtudonal Convendon should include Commonwealdi and State parliamentarians togcdier widi delegates represendng a wide range of community interests and viewpoints, whedier or not popularly elected. Thus, in 1921 die Hughes Government introduced a Bill (uldmately not proceeded widi) to establish a Consdtudonal Convendon comprising 75 popularly elected delegates and 36 delegates, half of whom would be nominated by the Commonwealdi and half by the States, although Prime Minister Hughes expressed willingness to dispense widi die nominated portion as advocated by Country Party leader Earle Page (Lumb, 1992:59-60) . A similar proposal by diree commentators, including Garedi Evans, in 1983 envisaged a Consdtudonal Convendon comprising 32 popularly elected delegates and 80 parliamentarians, including 16 from die Commonwealdi, eight from each State, two from each self-governing Territory and two local government representadves from each State (McMillan et al., 1983:366-7) .
Second, each of the diree groups pardcipadng in the Convention should con tribute a different dimension to its proceedings. The popularly elected delegates will primarily bring passion and commitment to die various shades of public opin ion on die republican issue; die parliamentary representadves embody polidcal ex perience and, one hopes, a facility for compromise, widi die Commonwealth gov ernment presumably determined to prevent die Convendon it proposed and estab lished from descending into acrimonious deadlock and shambles; and the ap-pointed delegates may offer a less passionate range of community views together with some legal and governmental experience. They may exert a moderating influ ence on the passionate commitment of the elected delegates; but this may repre sent an unduly optimistic perspective.
The Convention will debate whether or not Australia should become a repub lic; which republican model should be put to the electorate to consider against the status quo; and in what time frame and under what circumstances any change might be considered (Howard, 1997:3061) . The Howard Government has undertaken to put to referendum under section 128 of the Constitution any proposal endorsed by a 'consensus' at the Convention and, if no consensus eventuates, to hold an indica tive plebiscite on die republican issue. In eidier case, a vote on the republic issue is promised 'by the end of die year 2000' (Department of die Prime Minister and Cabinet, 1997:1).
The government has not defined what it considers a 'consensus', although die responsible Minister, Senator Nick Minchin, has suggested diat it means 'not simply a bare majority, but a clear majority', declining to be more specific (Taylor, 1996) . In view of die presence at die Convention of substantial numbers of both propo nents and opponents of die republic, a consensus either for or against severance of constitutional links widi the Crown appears unlikely. However, diere is a greater prospect of broad agreement on the issues of die 'how and when' of an Australian republic. Indeed bodi Prime Minister Howard and Convention chair Ian Sinclair have undertaken to work to diat end (Gordon & Hawes, 1997; Millett, 1997) .
The Convention's outcome will, to some extent, depend upon the agenda and procedures adopted at die Convention, on which die delegates should have die op portunity to vote. No more dian three of the Convention's ten days should be allo cated to consideration of die initial question 'whether or not Australia should be come a republic' and, on die other issues, broad principles should be debated radier than detailed proposed constitutional amendments. It would be calamitous for die Convention to become bogged down in debating die detailed language of proposed constitutional provisions governing the method of appointment or re moval of the Head of State or in attempting to codify the powers of die office. That task should be assigned to expert drafters at die conclusion of die Convention.
The Future
The performance of die tripartite February 1998 Convention will be closely ana lysed for years, since it is likely gready to influence die future direction of Australian constitutional reform. If it breaks down in deadlock, die combination of popularly elected delegates, parliamentarians and appointed citizens is unlikely to be repeated. On the other hand, if broad agreement is reached on a suitable model for republi can government, such a Convention will probably be employed for wider constitu tional debate.
The Howard Government initially envisaged that the Convention would con sider several issues in addition to the republic, including four-year Commonwealth parliamentary terms; the federal balance of power, including the external affairs power; admission of new States, especially the Northern Territory; and constitu tional recognition of local government. Further issues mentioned were the qualifi cations for membership of the Commonwealth parliament, appointment of High Court justices, and State-initiated constitutional referenda (Minchin, 1996:3-4) . However, while there is no difficulty in assigning any number of issues for consid eration by an appointed Convention including parliamentarians, the position is more complex when the Convention is popularly elected or includes a popularly elected component. Candidates will presumably stand for and against each major issue to be debated at the Convention, but will have no particular expertise or rep resentative point of view on other issues. Hence, the representative function of a popularly elected Convention will be most effective if the Convention is assigned a relatively small number of subjects.
However, some commentators have suggested that a Convention be elected periodically to consider appropriate constitutional reform. Twenty years ago, R. D. Lumb (1977:101) urged that such a gathering be convened 'at regular intervals'; and Cheryl Saunders (1994:119) has more recently suggested that 'regular constitutional reviews, elected or otherwise' be conducted every ten years. But frequent consti tutional review could undermine the sense of stability and permanence necessary for effective constitutional government.
Hence others have suggested constitu tional review at less frequent intervals, such as every 25 to 30 years (see Edel, 1981:9; Mueller, 1996:325) ; indeed, the Polish Constitution of 1791 expressly re quired die convening of an 'extraordinary constitutional diet' every 25 years (art VI, in Blaustein & Sigler, 1988:75) . Periodic constitutional review is undoubtedly necessary for, as Thomas Jefferson -'certainly [no] ... advocate for frequent and untried changes in laws and constitutions' -eloquendy noted, [IJaws and institutions must go hand in hand widi die progress of die hu man mind. As diat becomes more developed, more enlightened ... and manners and opinions change with die change of circumstances, institutions must advance also, and keep pace widi die times. W e might as well require However, constitutional review is probably best undertaken, not at some fixed interval, but when a considerable weight of public opinion acknowledges that the issue requires attention. Moreover, the method of review should be carefully adapted to the subject under consideration: for example, an issue of particular in terest to die States, such as federal financial relations or the potential republicanisation of State governments, requires greater State parliamentary participation than one in which the States have little direct involvement, such as four-year Common wealth parliamentary terms or the qualifications for membership of the Common wealth parliament.
The tripartite constitution of the February 1998 Convention is a novel experi ment; as has been well said, it is a 'most unconventional convention'.
Its per formance will be closely studied both in Australia and abroad for, if the combina tion of popularly elected representatives, parliamentarians and governmentappointed citizens proves an effective one, it may well provide a model for similar bodies in other countries contemplating constitutional change, such as Canada, New Zealand and even the United Kingdom. Australia has tried government-appointed commissions, parliamentary committees and parliamentary Conventions, all to no avail in the sense of actual constitutional alteration. The tripartite February 1998 Convention may well represent, to borrow President Lincoln's aphorism in his An nual Message to Congress of 1 December 1862, the 'last best hope' for Australian constitutional reform.
